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INTERESTED DIRECTORS IN CORPORATE
TRANSACTIONS
DANIEL JAMES*

The Youngstown-Bethlehem merger case, having awakened
a great deal of interest in the problem of the effect of common
directors upon intercorporation transactions, and Indiana having made a bid for corporate business by enactment of her General Corporation Act of 1929,2 the question 'of what our courts
will do with such transactions justifies inquiry. Cases presenting the problem of transactions between interlocking directorates are only one phase, though a large and important one, of
the general category of cases in which a board of directors enters into a transaction in which one or more of them have an
adverse interest. Indiana, showing remarkable versatility, has
announced her adherence in one case or another to almost every
possible rule on the subject. 3
* See biographical note, p 452.
1 Common Pleas, Ohio. The opinion is reported in The New York Times,

Dec. 30, 1930, p. 10, and in The Wall Street Journal,Dec. 30, 1930, p. 14.
2 Acts 1929, Ch. 215; Schortemeier and McNutt, Ind. Gen. Corp. Act.
Ann. (1929).
3The holdings of some of the cases are, chronologically: any contract in
which a director has an adverse interest is voidable upon mere showing of
the interest, whether fraud or unfairness is present or not, Port v. Russel,
36 Ind. 60 (1871); such a contract is valid unless fraud is proved, Hill v.
Nisbet, 100 Ind. 341 (1884); such a contract is governed by principles of
agency, requiring honesty from the agent in managing his principal's affairs, Wayne Pike Co. v. Hammons, 129 Ind. 368 (1891); such contracts are
valid unless fraud is proved, Evansville Public Hall Co. v. Bank of Commerce, 144 Ind. 34 (1896), Smith v. Wells Mfg. Co., 148 Ind. 333 (1897);
such contracts may be valid, voidable or void, depending upon the contract
and the circumstances of its creation. Wainwright v. Roots Co., 176 Ind.
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There have been three main doctrines advanced by the courts
in attempting to cope with contracts of a corporation entered
into on its behalf by a board of directors of which the membership is personally interested. One doctrine is to hold them voidable upon mere proof of personal interest. No showing of fraud
or unfairness is necessary. 4 This has been called the "prophylactic principle." 5 Corporate directors are in a fiduciary position as to the stockholders, 6 and on the strength of that relationship equity, according to principles of the strictest morality, will
refuse to allow temptation to be put in the way of the fiduciary
for fear that human nature will break down under so severe a
test. The court will not inquire into the fairness of the transaction7 Directors simply have no power to make such contracts
under strict trust rules. Nor does it make any difference
whether or not the interested member of the board votes; the
transaction will still be voidable ipso facto.8
682 (1912) ; such contracts are valid subject to a close scrutiny of the court
for absence of good faith, Bossert v. Geis, 57 Ind. App. 384 (1914); such a
contract is voidable unless good faith and fairness is proved, Zaring V. Kelly,
74 Ind. App. 581 (1920); such a contract is valid unless fraud is proved,
Public Service Com'n. v. City of Indianapolis, 193 Ind. 37 (1922); such a
contract is voidable unless good faith and fairness is proved, Schemmel v.
Hill, Ind. App., 169 N. E. 678 (1930).
4 Port v. Russel, 36 Ind. 60 (1871); Munson v. S., G. & C. R. R. Co.,
103 N. Y. 58 (1886); Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas Co., 151 App. Div.
(N. Y.) 184 (1912); Pam, Interlocking Directorates, 26 Harv. Law Rev.
467, 473 (1913).
5 Ballantine, Corporations,384 (1927).
6 Hill v. Nisbet, 100 Ind. 341, 353 (1884). A director is, strictly speaking, neither a trustee nor an agent. He may, however, be spoken of as
being in a fiduciary position or a position of trust. As to this, see Johnson,
Corporate Directors as Trustees, 23 Ill. Law Rev. 653 (1929); note in 29
Col. Law Rev. 338, 345 (1929).
7"[The law] does not stop to inquire whether the contract or transaction
was fair or unfair. It stops the inquiry when the relation is disclosed, and
sets aside the transaction or refuses to enforce it, at the instance of the
party whom the fiduciary undertook to represent, without attempting to deal
with the question of abstract justice in the particular case ....
The value
of the rule of equity to which we have adverted, lies to a great extent in
its stubbornness and inflexibility. Its rigidity gives it one of its chief uses
as a preventive or discouraging influence, because it weakens the temptation
to dishonesty or unfair dealing on the part of trustees, by vitiating, without
attempt at discrimination, all transactions in which they assume the duel
character of principal and representative." Munson v. S., G. & C. R. R. Go.,
103 N. Y. 58, 74 (1886).
8 "Nor is it important that plaintiff's president in the transaction in
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Aside from the application of the principles of trusteeship
to the conduct of directors, there are certain practical arguments
respecting proof which are advanced by the courts that support
this doctrine. "It prevents frauds by making them so far as
may be impossible, knowing that real motives often elude the
most searching inquiry.
.
The law can not accurately
9
measure the influence of a trustee with his associates. . .
This strict trust rule has been applied once in Indiana, in an
early case.' 0 The Ohio court, however, recently made this rule
a decisive factor in the Youngstown Case."
The second and pnost liberal doctrine respecting transactions
in the category with which we are dealing, holds them to be valid
unless fraud or unfairness is shown. The burden is upon the
party seeking to avoid the contract to furnish proof of such
fraud or unfairness. 12 This rule is generally stated as applying
question represented the defendant silently; that he did not openly advocate or vote for the adoption of the contracts. His negotiation of the same
implied and carried with it the force and effect of his approval." Globe
Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas Co., 151 App. Div. (N. Y.) 184 (1912).
"In law it should be immaterial how many directors vote in favor of a
contract or transaction in which a director, directly or indirectly, has an
interest; it should be set aside, and relief granted to the corporation and its
stockholders, even though the interested directors refrain from voting."
Pam, Interlocking Directorates,26 Harv. Law Rev. 467, 473 (1913).
9 Munson v. S., G. & C. R. R. Co., 103 N. Y. 58, 74 (1886). "We cannot
close our eyes to conditions as they are. We do know, in modern practice,
that one individual director frequently, if not in a majority of cases, is the
dominant force in the conduct of corporate affairs. We do know that banking firms and banking institutions whose representatives are on boards of
directors of different corporations, have a sphere of influence in the deliberations and decisions of such boards of directors that is'not measured by
the number of votes, but by the power exerted through relations and affiliations of common interest." Pam, op. cit., supra, note 8.
10 Port v. Russel, 36 Ind. 60 (1871).
See also Ward v. Yarnelle, 173
Ind. 535, 561-563 (1910), where, in a case in which a director was also a
secret partner in a firm that made a contract with his corporation, the
court reached the "prophylactic" result on principles of agency.
11 "A director whose official relation with both corporations was such as
is in a matter of such vital interest to both could not help, by the very
nature of the transaction, but be in adverse relation to one or the other.
He could not be neutral. He could not act wholly as a trustee for the selling corporation. . . . No question of the fairness of the transaction or of
his acts or intent is necessarily involved. The doctrine which here controls
arises solely from the nature of the transaction, the relation of the parties
thereto and the director's relation to them." Supra, note 1.
12 Evansville Public Hall Co. v. Bank of Commerce, 144 Ind. 34 (1896);
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in cases in which the interested directors are in a minority.13
It is said to be the prevailing view.'

4

Since it is an exceedingly liberal rule it is interesting to
notice that it was adopted in the three Indiana cases actually
involving interlocking directorates, all other cases on the subject
being those in which directors had adverse interests as private
individuals. Inasmuch as the language used by courts takes
color from the factual background into which it is being fitted,
the three common director cases will bear examination. The
first, Evansville Public Hall Company v. Bank of Commerce,' 5
was a case in which the directors and officers of a corporation,
on its behalf, borrowed money from a bank in which also they
were directors, giving a note therefor. When the note was sued
on, the court merely touched upon the common directorate, quoting and following a rule from Thompson on Corporations,that,
"while a contract between two corporations having common directors may be voidable, it is only so when the contract is in
fraud of the interests of one of the corporation, and will never
be set aside by the courts where the honesty of the transaction
is manifest."
In the second case, Smith v. Wells Manufacturing Company,'6
X was a common director of A corporation and B corporation.
A was indebted to B and also to other creditors to an extent that
it was insolvent. X procured a mortgage in favor of B on all
of A's property. When A's other creditors protested and threatened to sue to have the mortgage set aside, X was authorized by
his fellow directors in B "to do the best he could in the matter."
He released the mortgage. Subsequently B's directorate repudiated the release. On an agreed statement of facts it was stipulated that no fraud was involved. The court said that X's acts,
both in accepting the mortgage and in releasing it, were valid.
"It is held also that the mere fact that a contract is made between two corporations having common directors does not render such contract fraudulent or void."
Smith v. Wells Mfg. Co., 148 Ind. 333 (1897); Wainwright v. Roots Co.,
176 Ind. 682, 692 (1912) ; Bossert v. Geis, 57 Ind. App. 384, 390-392 (1914);
Public Service Commission v. City of Indianapolis, 193 Ind. 37 (1922).
13 Jesup v. L C. R. Co., 43 F. 483, 499 (C. C., N. D. Ill., 1890); Rolling
Stock Co. v. Railroad, 34 Ohio St. 450, 465-466 (1878). See also notes in
15 Harv. Law Rev. 672 (1902), and 29 Col. Law Rev. 338 (1929).
14 Ballentine, Corporations,392 (1927).
15 144 Ind. 34 (1896).
16 148 Ind. 333 (1897).
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Public Service Commission v. City of Indianapolis,17 the third
case, involved the merging of seven public utility companies into
an eighth, the plan having been approved by the Commission.
There were interlocking directorates throughout. The attack
on the plan was by the city of Indianapolis. Said the court:
"That two corporations have a majority or the whole membership of their boards of directors in common does not necessarily
render transactions between them void, in the absence of other
facts showing fraud even as against stockholders.
"
Three cases better adapted to the application of extreme liberality would be hard to imagine. In the first the common directorate was obviously being used only as a shield against the
payment of a fairly owned debt; in the second all question of
fraud was excluded by an agreed statement of facts; and in the
third the contract had been approved by the Public Service Commission, and was being attacked, not by a stockholder, but by an
outside party.
Directors of an insolvent corporation in Indiana are allowed
to prefer themselves or those for whom they are sureties as creditors for bona fide claims.1 s This is subject at least to the criticism that it allows the directors to use their position for a personal gain which was never intended to be an incident of that
position. It does not seem to be the majority view in America. 19
Before criticizing the foregoing doctrines let us consider the
third. It is that contracts in which directors are adversely interested are presumptively voidable, the burden being upon those
who would uphold the contract to establish its absolute fairness.
20
The doctrine can be supported on principles either of agency
21
or of the trust relationship.
It was well stated by the New Jersey court in Robotham v. Prudential Insurance Company:22
"The safe rule in most cases in the end will be found to be that
the presence of a director or directors on both sides of the trans17 193

Ind. 37 (1922).

18 Nappanee

Canning Co. v. Reid, Murdock & Co., 159 Ind. 614 (1903);
Adams Co. v. Federal Glass Co., 180 Ind. 576 (1913).
But see City Nat.
Bank v. Goshen Woolen Mills Co., 35 Ind. App. 562 (1904), declaring such

arrangements voidable per se, which was overruled, however, upon being
transferred to the Supreme Court, 163 Ind. 214 (1904).
19 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of Corporations, Sec. 2271 (1919).
20 Rochester v. Levering, 104 Ind. 562, 568 (1885).
21 Zaring v. Kelly, 74 Ind. App. 581, 583 (1920).
22 64 N. J. Eq. 673, 709-710 (1903).
510 (1903).

See also note in 16 Harv. Law Rev.
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action under investigation does not give the dissenting stockholder an arbitrary right to an injunction, but may give him a
most ample right to subject the transaction to the scrutiny of
the court, and may cast upon the corporations or directors concerned the burden of disclosing and justifying the transaction."
This rule has also the sanction of the Supreme Court of the
United States, where it has found expression in the following
language: "The relation of directors to corporations is of such
a fiduciary nature that transactions between boards having common members are regarded as jealously by the law as are personal dealings between a director and his corporation; and
where the fairness of such transactions is challenged, the burden
is upon those who would maintain them to show their entire
fairness; and where a sale is involved, the full adequacy of the
consideration. . . . This court has been consistently emphatic in the application of this rule, which, it has declared, is
founded in soundest morality, and we now add, in soundest busi3
ness policy."2
It is submitted that of the three doctrines the third is the
soundest. To declare all contracts and transactions in which a
director has an adverse interest voidable per se too greatly
hampers corporation business. Many instances arise in whicl
such transactions are necessary or for the best interests of the
enterprise. Moreover, the ultra strictness of the rule, which is
supposed to be its dominant virtue, often has an effect exactly
contrary to the intended "prophylactic" effect. It may simply
cause transactions to take place under cover. 24 On the other
hand, to declare contracts of the kind we are considering pre§umptively valid is neither fair nor in accordance with the fiduciary position occupied by directors. It places the burden of
showing fraud or unfairness upon the parties who are attacking
the contract, usually stockholders, who are in no such advantageous position to marshal evidence respecting corporate trans23 Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U. S. 590, 599 (1921);
also, CorsicanaNational Bank v. Johnson, 251 U. S. 68, 90 (1919).

24 "To give the dissenting stockholder the arbitrary right to an injunction in this class of cases often will put a deadly weapon in the hands of
the blackmailer and the corporation 'striker.' Such a rule tends to drive
the actual wrongdoers to cover, to induce them to seek concealment, while
the corporate action is accomplished through apparently impartial directors,
who ire, in fact, only agents or 'dummies.'" Robotham v. Prudential Ins.

Co., 64 N. J. Eq. 673, 710 (1903).
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actions as are the directors. The third doctrine, of considering
the contract presumptively voidable, places the burden of establishing its fairness upon those who are in command of the evidence, the directors. In the great majority of cases in which the
contract actually is fair, they ought to have little trouble in proving it. This rule recognizes the frequent necessity of such transactions, while at the same time it reduces to a minimum the likelihood of undetected perpetration of fraud.
The Indiana Appellate Court has followed the third doctrine
in two cases, one of them the most recent pronouncement in the
state on the subject. 2 5 It is noticeable that the same rule
would have worked equally well in any of the other Indiana
cases: in those in which the contract actually was unfair, the
decision clearly would have gone against the fundamental parties; and in the cases in which the contract turned out to be
bona fide and valid, from the situations as set forth in the reports, the directors attempting to uphold the contracts should
have been easily able to establish the fact of fairness. Although
there seems to be a tendency to hold that contracts by a director
with his corporation for lending money to it or performing personal services outside the scope of his official duties, are presumptively valid, 26 there would seem to be no reason for this
exception to a uniform rule. It is a fact that the corporate
director is in a position about as nearly like that of a trustee as is
possible without actually being a trustee-a position giving him
numberless opportunities to serve himself at the expense of his
corporation. This fact is manifest in the large number of cases
involving unfair practices of the director.27 Therefore, when
25

"The fiduciary relation of each of the appellants to the company was

such that each had the burden of showing that he had acted in good faith
with the company, and those concerned with its affairs, and this burden they
failed to discharge." Zaring v. Kelly, 74 Ind. App. 581, 583 (1920). Cited
and followed in Schemmel v. Hill, Ind. App. 169 N. E. 678 (1930). See also
Leader Pub. Co. v. Grant Trust Co., 182 Ind. 651, 661 (1915).
26 Twin-Lick Oil Co. v. Alarbury, 91 U. S. 587 (1875); Kenner v. Whitelock, 152 Ind. 635, 637 (1899) ; Wainwright v. Roots Co., 176 Ind. 682, 691
(1912) ; note in 29 Col. Law Rev. 338, 342-343, 347 (1929).
27 Of course the reports of the cases do not and cannot always set forth

the full intricacies of the transactions.

Such information as is elicited in

testimony by directors about their personal profits is usually given reluct-

antly. But as to what could be and was done by directors at the expense
of their corporations in the insurance business before that business came
under strict state supervision, see Rep. Joint Com. of Senate and Assembly,
N. Y., Assembly Document No. 41, Vol. x, passim, and esp. pp. 28-36, 47-48,
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he is in possession of all evidence respecting corporate transactions, especially those to which he personally is a party, to ask
him to present proof of their fairness is surely no hardship
upon him.
One important question remains: should directors who are
also shareholders be allowed to vote as shareholders upon questions in which they have a personal interest different from that
of the corporation? The prevailing rule says that they should.
As stated by the Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey:
"They [the director-shareholder] voted upon that resolution,
not as directors, not in their fiduciary capacity, but solely in the
right of the shares of stock held by them. A most valuable privilege, which attaches to the ownership of stock in a corporation,
is the right to vote upon it at any meeting of stockholders
As stockholders, they owed no greater duty to their co-stockholders than those stockholders owed to them. Like other stockholders, they had a right to be influenced by what they conceived
to be for their own interest, and they can not lawfully be denied
that right, nor can it be limited or circumscribed by the fact that
28
It is
they occupied the position of directors in the company."
also held, under this rule, that what directors can not do as a
board they can sometimes ratify and render valid by voting as
29
stockholders.
The rule has been criticized by the writer of a note in the
HarvardLaw Review 30 on the basis that abrogation of it would
affect only a very small class of shareholders and would give corporations a free hand in discarding undesirable contracts. The
fallacy in the criticism is that, whereas the interested directors
may be a small class of shareholders in point of members, they
are by no means always small with respect to the number of
shares owned, which after all is a factor of some importance in
corporate voting. It is not at all unusual for one or more of the
directors to own a majority of the voting stock; so that to take
away their voting privilege would be to subject the corporation
to minority rule without any practical necessity for so doing.3 1
67-68, 76-78, 80-81, 118-119, 126, 129-132, 138-143 (1906).

Charles Evans

Hughes, now Chief Justice Hughes, was examining counsel.
28

U. S. Steel Corp. v. Hodge, 64 N. J. Eq. 807, 813 (1903).

The English

rule is in accord, the leading cases being North-West TransportationCo. v.
Beatty, L. R., 12 A. C. 589 (1887).
29 Bjorngaardv. Goodhue County Bank, 49 Minn. 483 (1892).
30

16 Harv. Law Rev. 587 (1903).

31 Bjorngaard v. Goodhue County Bank, 49 Minn. 483 (1892); North-
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Indiana follows the majority view. In Green v. Felton,32
there was a shareholders' meeting, duly called, which was attended, however, only by shareholders who were also directors.
A by-law was passed authorizing the board of directors to fix
salaries for officers and directors. Under the authority of this
by-law the board voted themselves an annual salary, which was
found to be fair. A suit was brought by minority shareholders
to compel the directors to account for sums so paid to them. The
court decided for the directors, saying that, although in the
absence of the by-law they had no authority to fix their own
salaries, the by-law passed by them as shareholders gave them
such authority as directors.
Of course, if a majority of the shares in a corporation happen
to come into the hands of only one or several persons, who happen also to be directors, and they use the power thus acquired in
fraud of the corporation and the minority shareholders, this can
be remedied; but they can then be attacked in the courts in their
capacity as majority shareholders as well as in their capacity
as directors. 33
West Tvansportation Co. v. Beatty, L. R., 12 A. C. 589 (1887). In the latter case the decision was expressly rested upon the grounds that, "to reject
the votes of the defendant upon the question of the adoption of the by-law
would be to give effect to the views of the minority, and to disregard those
of the majority."
32 42 Ind. App. 675 (1908).
33 "Another well recognized exception to the rule of majority control is
the doctrine that the majority will not be permitted to exercise their control
in such manner as to defraud the minority either by making an unfair
profit out of dealings between them and the corporation or by reorganizing
the corporation so as to 'freeze out' the minority." Dodd, Nebraska Business Corporations,5 Neb. Law Bull. 380, 395 (1927); also Machen, Modern
Law of Corporations, Sec. 1306 (1908); Fletcher, Cyclopedia of Corporations, Sec. 3973 (1919).

